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Reducing Excessive and Unjustified Awards
In Lender Liability Cases
By Kenneth M. Lodge*
& Thomas J. Cunningham**
The law of lender liability is aimed at redressing injuries caused to a
borrower by its lender.' Although there has been massive growth in the
number of cases alleging lender liability over the past 10 years or so, 2 it is
hardly a new phenomenon. 3 One of the main reasons for the growth of
lender liability has been the courts' willingness to apply a variety of tort
theories to lending relationships at the behest of creative borrowers and
their counsel - usually advanced as counterclaims or affirmative defenses
to lenders' lawsuits on defaulted obligations.4 In the paradigm lender

* B.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Seton Hall University College of Law. Mr. Lodge is
a member of the New Jersey and Illinois Bars and a partner at the Chicago law firm of Smith
Williams & Lodge Chartered. Mr. Lodge concentrates his practice in commercial and banking
litigation.
** B.S., Arizona State University; J.D., DePaul University College of Law. Mr. Cunningham
is the former Executive Editor of the DePaul Business Law Journal and is associated with the
Chicago law firm of Smith Williams & Lodge Chartered.
1. For purposes of this article, the term "lender" will refer to lending institutions, banks,
savings and loan associations, equity lenders, investment vehicles, and individuals. Generally,
however, the article is directed toward the liabilities of lending institutions.
2. Kenneth L. Howe, FailingBusinesses DraggingBanks To The Courtroom,SAN FRANCISCO
Bus. J., Sep. 22, 1986, at 1; L.A. Hughes, Small Banks Fear Spread of Lender Liability Suits, S. FLA.
Bus. J., Aug. 10, 1987, at 25; Rash of Lender Liability Suits Seen PeakingAs Lenders Adjust, BNA'S
BANKING REP., Aug. 17, 1987, at 310; Kirk Victor, Lender Liability Doctrine Gives Creditors Clout;
Suing the Bankers, NAT'L L.J., Sep. 1, 1986, at 1; IBAA Urges Support For Legislative Solution To
Lender Liability Problem, PR Newswire, June 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File; Herbert Swartz, New Business Trend: If Loan Goes Bad, Sue Your Banker, NEW ORLEANS
BUS., May 26, 1986, at IA.
3. See, e.g., Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937); Earl Park State Bank
v. Lowmon, 161 N.E. 675 (Ind. App. 1928).
4. The following tort theories are most often used by plaintiffs to hold lenders accountable for
actions that may or may not be contractually justified: (1) breach of fiduciary duty (Whitney v.
Citibank, 782 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1986)); (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
(K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Sterling Faucet Co. v. First Municipal
Leasing Corp., 716 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1983); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Calif. Bank, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409 (Mont. 1985); First Nat'l
Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil
Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983)); (3) actual
fraud (General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1985);
Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 701 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1985); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)); (4) constructive fraud (Central States Stamping Co. v.
Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1984); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984);
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liability case, the borrower claims that the lender misled the borrower about
its intention to declare a default,5 that the lender promised to provide future
financing that was never in fact provided,6 or that the lender misrepresented
the borrower's financial condition to a third party.7 Disgruntled borrowers
base their claims on theories such as fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
tortious interference with contractual or business relations. These "extracontractual" theories increase damage award amounts by changing the
methods of establishing and calculating damages.8 The purpose of this
article is not to discuss these theories or their development, as this has been
done adequately elsewhere.9 Rather, this article concedes (for the sake of
argument) the validity of the theories and will examine the damage aspect
of litigation based upon these theories.'"

Barrett v. Bank of America, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)); (5) duress (Pecos Constr. Co.
v. Mortgage Investment Co., 459 P.2d 842 (N.M. 1969)); and (6) negligent misrepresentation
(Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984)).
5. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
6. See, e.g., Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 701 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1985).
7. See, e.g., General Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771 (7th Cir.
1985).
8. For example, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth
Circuit affirmed a jury award of $7,500,000 based upon a lender's refusal to advance additional
funds, even though the loan agreement specifically and unequivocally granted the lender the sole and
unfettered discretion to refuse further advances. In Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska
1983), the Supreme Court of Alaska allowed compensatory and punitive damages based upon the
lender's taking possession of collateral without notice - despite the fact that the contract clearly
authorized such repossession. See also Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Calif. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr.
551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (tort damages justified based upon "special relationship" between lenders
and borrowers); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
See also Charles M. Louderback and Thomas W. Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of
Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 187, 205 (1982). It has also been suggested that
one result of the application of extracontractual theories to a lender liability context is the
undermining of the efficiency of capital markets. See James R. Borders, Note, The Growth of Lender
Liability: An Economic Perspective, 21 GA. L. REV. 723, 742-54 (1987).
9. Melissa Cassedy, Note, The Doctrineof LenderLiability, 40 FLA. L. REV. 165 (1988); Troy
H. Gott & William L. Townsley, Note, Lender Liability: A Survey of Theories, Thoughts and Trends,
28 WASHBURN L.J. 238 (1988); John 0. Tyler, Jr., Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas,
24 Hous. L. REV. 411 (1987); Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors:
Toward a ConceptualFramework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986); Lawrence F. Flick & Dennis Replansky,
Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls & Protections,103 BANKING L.J. 220 (1986); Edward
L. Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part I - The Relevance of Contract Doctrine, 100
BANKING L.J. 220 (1983); Edward L. Symons, The Bank-CustomerRelation: Part11- The Judicial
Decisions, 100 BANKING L.J. 325 (1983).
10. Professor Daniel R. Fischel has suggested that if the economics of lender-borrower
relationships were properly understood, there would be no issue when it comes to damages.
Nevertheless, Fischel seems resigned to the fact that there are in fact unresolved issues with regard
to damages in lender liability cases, and that they are "in serious need of attention." Daniel R.
Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 133, 147 (1989).

LENDER LIABILITY CASES

Damages in lender liability cases are often quite high." For example,
in FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. v. Scharenberg,12 defendant
Continental Illinois was found liable for improperly refusing to lend $3
million to a borrowing real estate developer. The plaintiff had requested
$105 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive
damages. Ultimately, the jury awarded compensatory damages in the
amount requested. 3
How does a judge or jury determine that a bank failing to make a $3
million loan should be responsible to the offended borrower to the tune of
$105 million? More importantly, what can lenders and their counsel do to
reduce the likelihood of such awards? In order to answer these questions,
we must begin with an inquiry into the methods and theories of calculating
damages in lender liability cases.
I. Contract Theories of Damage
An analysis of what damages should be available when a borrower is
mistreated by a lender should begin with the realization that loan
agreements, and hence lending relationships, are nothing more than
commercial contracts. In their seminal article on contract damages,
Professors Fuller and Perdue identified three purposes for the award of
damages when a contract is breached. 4 The first theory assumes that the
breaching party has gained some benefit as a result of the breach, and the
remedy is to make the breaching party disgorge the benefit received. 5

11. Between 1979 and 1989, borrowers were awarded about $1 billion from their lenders. Gail
Appleson, Borrowers Go After Lenders in BurgeoningArea of Law, REUTER Bus. REP., Oct. 2, 1989.
It has been speculated that one of the reasons for large awards is that juries inherently dislike banks.
Id In 1987, six of the ten highest jury awards involved lender liability suits, all exceeding $50
million. Richard C. Tufaro and J. Huntley Palmer, The Measure of Damages in Lender Liability
Actions, in LENDER LiABILrrT LmGATioN 1988, at 679, 681 (PLI 1988) [hereinafter Tufaro &
Palmer).
12. No. 84-2712-CIV-DAVIS; No. 87-021 l-CIV-DAVIS; No. 87-0238-CIV-DAVIS (S.D. Fla.
April 29, 1987).
13. For examples of other large damage awards against lenders, see Conlan v. Wells Fargo, No.
82852 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. June 10, 1987) (jury award to borrower of $10 million in
compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages); Jewell v. Bank of America, No.
112439 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1986) (jury award of $19 million in compensatory damages and
$27 million in punitive damages); Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp.
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court in bench trial awarded $130 million), rev'd, 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 189 S. Ct. 1639 (1989); Robinson v. McAllen State Bank, No. C-1948-84-D (Tex. Dist.
Ct. 1987) (verdict of $10 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive damages).
14. L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936). The three theories of Fuller and Perdue form the basis of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS' damages rules.

(1979).
15.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344

Fuller & Perdue, supra note 14, at 54.
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This is referred to as the restitution interest.1 6 The second theory is
applied when the nonbreaching party has relied to its detriment on the
promise of the breaching party. 7 This is called the reliance interest, and
the object is to undo any harm resulting from the nonbreaching party's
reliance. 8 The final theory is geared toward giving the promisee the
benefit expected or, in other words, putting the nonbreaching party in the
same position that he or she would have been in had the contract been
performed as promised. 9 This is referred to as the expectation interest. 20
The restitution theory is not likely to be applied in many lender
liability cases. 2' When lenders breach contracts with borrowers, it is
usually because they want to cut their losses, not to gain some benefit at the
expense of the borrower. In other words, in many lender liability cases the
lender is already facing a net loss when it misbehaves. Hence, there is
nothing that can be "disgorged" to the borrower.
Contract damages in lender liability cases, therefore, will generally be
based upon the remaining two theories: reliance and expectation. Of the
two, expectation is the more difficult to determine and the more dangerous
from the lender's viewpoint 22 because it seeks to compensate the borrower
for something that cannot be known with certainty.23 Reliance damages
are easier to quantify, but questions remain as to why they should be
recovered in the first place. The lending of money in and of itself does not
create wealth. If a borrower arranges for $100 in financing and does not get
it, the borrower is not out-of-pocket $100. It may be difficult, therefore, to

16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18.

Id.

19. Id.
20. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 14, at 54. See also Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d
1098 (7th Cir. 1981); Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe, 158 Cal. Rptr. 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);
Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958).
21. For a further discussion of the restitution theory, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My
Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339
(1985).
22. Many commentators have suggested that protection of the reliance interest should be the
primary goal of contract law. See Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance:
PromissoryEstoppel, ContractFormalities,andMisrepresentations,15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987);
Mary E. Becker, PromissoryEstoppel Damages, 16 HOFSThrA L. REV. 131 (1987); Richard Bronaugh,
Lost Opportunitiesin ContractDamages, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 735 (1983); Daniel A. Farber & John
H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985); Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A HistoricalPerspective, 1984
Wis. L. REV. 1373 (1984); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation
of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 52 (1981); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips,
Promissory Estoppel and the Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139 (1980).
23. See John Leubsdorf, Remedies For Uncertainty, 61 B.U. L. REV. 132 (1981).

LENDER LIABILITY CASES

see how the borrower could recover more than the $100 it was wrongfully
denied.24 However, many lender liability cases are in fact brought by
borrowers who claim they are worse off than they were before engaging in
a relationship with their lenders.'
A. Undoing The Harm: Reliance Damages
Where a borrower has actually relied upon the lender's promises and
suffered some damage as a result of the reliance, the borrower is entitled
to greater relief than the borrower who merely failed to get what it
expected.
[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he
may not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more
pressing case for relief than the promisee who merely demands
satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what was promised
him. In passing from compensation for change of position to
compensation for loss of expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms
again, 26
from the realm of corrective justice to that of distributive
justice.
Some jurisdictions refer to what is called an "out-of-pocket" measure of
damages, based purely upon the extent of the borrower's reliance.27 The
"out-of-pocket" theory reduces, rather than expands, the amount of
recoverable damages because it essentially denies the borrower
consequential and puntive damages.
For example, in Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn,28 the New York
Court of Appeals held that the borrower could recover its out-of-pocket
expenses incurred in reliance upon the lender's misrepresentation, but not
its lost profits. Recovery of damages beyond one's out-of-pocket costs may
therefore require either the expectation theory of damage calculation or a
statutory expansion of recoverable damages. 29 For example, California
has statutorily provided that a borrower may recover both out-of-pocket
24. See Fischel, supra note 10, at 133.
25. In other words, Fischel bases his remarks on a refusal of a lender to extend credit. While
this is certainly one of the most prevalent lender liability situations, there are others as well, including
situations where the lender takes an active role in the running of the borrower's business. See, e.g.,
Kenneth M. Lodge, et al., A Lender's Liability For Agent Misdeeds, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
(forthcoming 1993); Kenneth M. Lodge & Thomas J. Cunningham, The Banker as Inadvertent
Fiduciary: Beware the Borrower's Special Trust & Confidence, COM. L.J. (forthcoming 1993).
26. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 14, at 56.
27. Tufaro and Palmer, supra note 11, at 686.
28. 409 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1978).
29. See generally Robert E. Hudec, Restating the "Reliance Interest", 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704
(1982); Paul T. Wangerin, Damagesfor Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law: Of Blind Men and
Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REv. 47 (1986).
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expenses incurred as a result of reliance on a lender's misrepresentation and
lost profits.30
At first blush, putting the borrower back in the position it would have
occupied had the borrower and lender never met seems simple.
Nevertheless, things can get quite complicated when examined more
closely. As Fuller and Perdue have recognized, lost opportunities are an
important form of reliance damages. 3' That is, if the borrower relied on
the lender's promise to fund a loan and the lender breached its promise, the
borrower should recover not only for its out-of-pocket losses,32 but also
for whatever opportunities it passed up as a result of relying on the lender's
promise.33
The losses resulting from missed opportunities are losses the borrower
expected to incur regardless of whether the lender fully performed.' The
borrower merely hoped that the gains that would result from the lender's
performance would exceed the sum of its lost opportunities.35 In this
sense, reliance damages look a lot like expectation damages, at least in
lender liability cases. Generally, the difference between expectation and
reliance damages is "the difference in value to the plaintiff of (1) the
contract he formed with the defendant and (2) the alternative contract (if
any) the plaintiff would have formed with someone else had he not
contracted with the defendant. 36
In a lender liability context, if the borrower would have obtained
financing from another lender at the same rate of interest, the borrower has
suffered no reliance damage absent special circumstances. If the borrower
could have obtained a better rate of interest elsewhere, it presumably would
have done so in the first place.3 7 If the borrower obtains alternate

30. CALIF. CIVIL CODE § 3343 (West 1970 & 1993 Supp.). See Hartman v. Shell Oil Co., 137
Cal. Rptr. 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). But see Hartwell Corp. v. Bumb, 345 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1965)
(although out-of-pocket expense is the correct measure under California law, under the circumstances,
the benefit of the bargain approach would be the more accurate measure).
31. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 14, at 55, 60.
32. The borrower would not likely have very much of an "out-of-pocket" loss - perhaps a loan
application fee, a cost for doing an appraisal of collateral.
33. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 14, at 55, 60; Robert Cooter and Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Damages For Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1432, 1440-41 (1985); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The BargainPrincipleand its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 n.10 (1982); Charles J. Goetz and
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examinationof the Basisof Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261,
1269 (1980). See also Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 399 A.2d 1374 (Md. Ct. App. 1979).
34. See Kinzley v. United States, 661 F.2d 187, 193 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
35. Mark Pettit, Private Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and
Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 421 (1987).
36. Id. at 422.
37. "Credit markets are intensely competitive; alternative sources of credit abound." Fischel,
supra note 10, at 136.
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financing at a worse rate, the borrower simply recovers the difference
between the rates.3 g When looked at this way, reliance damages end up
being the same as expectation damages. The borrower has passed up the
opportunity to obtain financing from a non-breaching lender, but at the cost
of paying a higher interest rate. If we deduct the value of the higher rate
from the value of the lower rate actually obtained, we arrive at a value equal
to the benefit of the borrower's bargain - which is equal to the value of the
borrower's reliance on the lender's promise to provide funds at a lower rate.
That is, if the borrower had obtained the financing from another lender, and
we assume that the alternate lender would not have breached, then the
borrower's reliance damages are the lost benefits of the bargain expectation damages.39
B. Benefit of the Bargain: Expectation Damages
Most courts will apply the "benefit of the bargain" analysis to the
measurement of damages in a breach of contract case. ' The goal is to

38. See, e.g., Financial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Continental Enters., Inc., 338 So.2d 907, 908
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (damage properly measured by additional interest cost of substitute loan,
but increased payments to be made in future had to be discounted to present value); First Miss. Bank
v. Latch, 433 So.2d 946, 951 (Miss. 1983) (recovery of plaintiff borrower limited to difference
between agreed upon interest rate and rate paid to secure funds committed to by lender, but not
disbursed); Consolidated Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So.2d 894, 898 (Miss. 1974)
(borrowers who had to obtain money elsewhere after lender's breach were entitled to additional
interest they had to pay and attorney's fee required to secure new loan); Eaton v. Danziger, 246
N.Y.S. 98 (1930) (plaintiff entitled to recover excess of legal rate of interest over rate promised to
pay lender; however, no excess proven and plaintiff awarded 6 cents nominal damages); Allied Silk
Mfrs., Inc. v. Erstein, 186 N.Y.S. 295, 296 (1921) ("If it had obtained another factor, the difference
in cost to it between such agreement and the cost under defendants' agreement, for the duration of
the latter contract, would have been the measure of damage."); Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc., 258
S.E.2d 778, 787 (N.C. 1979) (when contract to make loan is breached, borrower is entitled to
"[d]ifferential between cost of obtaining new financing and the interest payments specified in the
contract").
39. This has been referred to as a "tort/contract hybrid":
[T]o the extent it takes into account other, forgone opportunities which were available to
the relying party, full protection of the reliance interest can be seen as a kind of
tort/contract hybrid, attempting to put plaintiff not merely in the position he or she
formerly occupied, but in the position that he or she would have attained were it not for
the reliance in question.
CHARLES L. KNAPP, COMMERCIAL DAMAGES: A GUIDE To REMEDIES IN BusiNESs LrIGATIoN
2.01 at 2-4 (1991) [hereinafter "KNAPP"].
Despite the conclusion that in lender liability cases reliance damages and expectation damages
end up being the same, lenders would be wise to argue that the court should apply a reliance
rationale to the calculation of damages. Reliance damages are more difficult to prove - both the
act of reliance itself, as well as the measurement of reliance. See Cooter and Eisenberg, supra note
33, at 1461. On the other hand, this may lead to less continuity among the courts and hence undercut
the advantages sought by the lending community as a whole.
40. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145
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place the borrower in the same position it expected to have been in had the
lender performed. 41 There are two limitations on this theory. First, the
borrower may not recover unforeseeable damages. 2 Second, damages
cannot be recovered if they could have been avoided by the borrower
through reasonable efforts.4 3 Both of these limitations are discussed later
in this article. 44
It is important to remember that the expectation principle attempts to
place the borrower in the position it expected to be in at the time of
contracting, not the position it would actually have been in had the lender
performed. 45 Lenders are thus protected from the burden of compensating
borrowers for all of the harm caused by their misbehavior. 4"
Unfortunately, courts too often try to determine what position the borrower
would have been in "but for" the lender's breach, rather than focusing on
the parties' expectations.
Trying to determine what would have happened leads the court down
the primrose path to unreality. As the court seeks to find out what actually
would have happened and is frustrated, it will turn to what probablywould
have happened. This leads to a comparison of the actual situation at the
time of the breach with similar situations where no breach occurred.
As a court's findings about a violation's effects and the conditions that
would have existed absent a violation become less particularized, it
becomes less and less realistic to think of the court as seeking to restore
the world that would have existed had the law not been violated.

(1970) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Legal Remedies].
41.

See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).

Note

that the converse is not true. That is, if the borrower breaches an agreement to borrow a certain sum
of money at a certain rate of interest, the lender will not likely be successful in suing the borrower
for the difference between the interest rate the borrower would have taken the funds at and the
interest rate at which the funds were actually loaned. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. NCR
Corp., 603 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aftd, 772 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Teachers
Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (plaintiff lender awarded
difference between the contracted rate of interest and the prevailing rate of interest during the month
after the contemplated loan closing, amortized over the 35 year term of the loan and discounted to
present value).
42. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (QB 1854); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond
Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989).
See also infra notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
43. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967 (1983).
44. Mitigation is discussed infra at notes 51-58 and accompanying text. Foreseeability is
common to both contract and tort damages, and is therefore discussed in the section of the article
covering the common concepts, infra at notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
45. Leubsdorf, supra note 23, at 136.
46.

WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTs 250-70 (4th ed. 1971); Farnsworth,

Legal Remedies, supra note 40, at 1203.

LENDER LIABILITY CASES

Instead, the court is handing out standardized remedies, somewhat in the
nature of insurance payments.47
Making awards based upon what usually happens in similar situations has
been justified "as a means of encouraging and protecting reliance upon
promises. '"48 But, the net result is confusion on the part of lenders as to
how much risk they face as a consequence of breach. As Judge Posner has
pointed out, "it is not the policy of the law to compel adherence to contracts
but only to require each party to choose between performing in accordance
with the contract and compensating the other party for any injury resulting
from a failure to perform."4' 9 This policy is frustrated when courts do not

determine the known expectations and ability to cover losses and instead
apply some standardized "form remedy"-based upon what usually happens
in similar situations.50
The theory of efficient breach as described by Judge Posner provides
that if the lender feels insecure about advancing funds as promised, and the
borrower can obtain financing elsewhere at a higher rate of interest, the
lender may choose to breach the contract and pay the borrower the
difference in interest. Should the borrower fail to seek replacement
financing, however, and sue the lender claiming that it was unable to
complete a project due to the lender's breach, the borrower should not be
able to recover more than could have been obtained had it found alternate
financing.
Therefore, in awarding damages based upon the expectation theory,
courts should focus upon the reasonable expectations that existed when the
contract was made, and the ability of the borrower to cover when the lender
breaches. For example, let us consider a contractor that plans to build a
hotel for a developer who expects the property to be worth $50 million
upon completion. The developer needs to borrow $35 million to complete
the project. The lender agrees that the project, if completed according to
plan, will be worth $50 million and therefore feels safe in lending $35
million. These are the parties' expectations at the outset of the relationship.

47.
48.

Leubsdorf, supra note 23, at 149.
Farnsworth, Legal Remedies, supra note 40.

49. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 88 (2d ed. 1977) (citing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 175 (1920)).

50. This policy is not without controversy. For example, in Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage
Selections, 971 F.2d 401, 408 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit said that "tort damages are available
where restricting recovery to contract damages would 'provide more an incentive for breach of the
contract than for its performance.' (quoting Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986)
(discussing whether breach of an impled covenant may provide the basis for tort damages)). This
theory would seem to imply that a party should not be allowed to breach a contract and pay contract
damages merely because it is economically efficient.
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Now assume that at some point, the lender refuses to continue funding
the loan and breaches the agreement. The market for hotels might make the
project worth $60 million if completed, given changes that have occurred
since the making of the loan. More likely, the changed conditions would
decrease the value of the project, say to $40 million. Regardless, under the
expectation theory of damages, the borrower should recover the $15 million
difference between the expected value of the completed project and its
expected cost, assuming it is unable to cover.
Before the borrower can recover its expectation interest, however, it
must attempt to mitigate its damages by seeking alternative financing
elsewhere.
C. Limitations on The Recovery of ContractDamages: Mitigation
It is a fundamental concept of contract law that nonbreaching parties
must attempt to mitigate their damages as much as possible.5" The failure
to do so precludes the injured party from recovering damages for any loss
that it could have avoided. 2 Steps to mitigate damages must be taken
promptly.53 The burden is placed on the breaching party to raise the issue
of the non-breaching party's failure to mitigate damages.54
Borrowers whose lenders refuse to provide promised funds must
therefore make reasonable attempts to locate alternative funding55 in order

51. See, e.g., Advanced Medical v. Arden Medical Systems, 955 F.2d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 1992).
52. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 12.12 at 859 (1982) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH).
53. Id. at 862.
54. Kensington Rock Island, L.P. v. American Eagle Historic Partners, 921 F.2d 122 (7th Cir.
1990); Stanley Gudyka Sales Co., Inc. v. Lacy Forest Products Co., 915 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1990);
Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 814 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S.
820 (1987); Turner and Boisseau v. Marshall Adjusting Corp., 775 F. Supp. 372 (D. Kan. 1991);
Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, 730 F. Supp. 74 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
55. See KNAPP, supra note 39, 1 62.03[1] at 62-9 n.8 (citing Golbar Properties, Inc. v. North
Am. Mortgage lnvs., 78 A.D.2d 504 (1980), aftid, 53 N.Y.2d 856 (1981)) ("burden of proving failure
to mitigate or avoid damage is on breaching party; thus, where defendants made no showing that the
mortgage held by plaintiff had value, facts indicated that mortgage had no value and the sale of the
property would have produced no return and defendant did not meet their burden; plaintiff not
required to foreclose on the building to mitigate damages"); Hidalgo Prop., Inc. v. Wachovia
Mortgage Co., 617 F.2d 196, 200 (10th Cir. 1980) (aggrieved borrower must make reasonable effort
to mitigate or lessen damages; but he need not unreasonably exert himself or incur an unreasonable
expense); Pontchartrain State Bank v. Duden, 503 F. Supp. 764,769 (E.D. La. 1980) (plaintiffs were
barred from recovering any damages from alleged wrongful acts of defendant lender since they failed
to use all reasonable means to mitigate claimed damages); Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 401 A.2d 651, 660
(Md. Ct. App. 1979), affd, 423 A.2d 257 (1981) (borrower must avoid losses claimed by reasonable
effort or expense without risk of additional loss or injury); Riverside Park Realty Co. v. FDIC, 465
F. Supp. 305, 315 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) ("The rule requiring an injured party to prevent avoidable
consequences of a breach is especially applicable with regard to breaches of contracts to lend money
.... Damage in such cases is thought to be easily avoidable because the injured party can usually
procure the money from other lenders."); Malex Realty Corp. v. Hageman, 201 N.Y.S. 677 (1923)
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to recover damages based on the failure to lend. This principle was applied
in Utah Farm ProductionCreditAss'n v. Cox.16 There, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that a borrower "may not, either by action or inaction,
aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach, but has a duty to actively
mitigate his damages."57 Thus, a would-be borrower who has been denied
58
promised funds must "actively seek alternate financing.
D. The Appropriatenessof ContractDamage Methodology
Relationships between persons are governed by a system of
overlapping legal duties. These duties may arise as a matter of law (tort
duties) or they may arise as a matter of agreement between the parties
(contract duties). Some duties that arise as a matter of law may be
intentionally altered by agreement. The question of whether to apply a
contract or tort methodology to damage analysis depends upon the duty
breached. There is no common law duty that says a lender must provide
funds to a borrower. If the lender has failed to provide funds, the borrower
may not recover damages unless it can prove that the parties agreed that the
lender would do so and that the lender failed to live up to that agreement.
On the other hand, there is no need for the parties to expressly agree that the
lender will not interfere with the borrower's other contracts. That is a duty
that arises as a matter of law and not out of the contract. 59 Thus, if the
lender interferes with the borrower's other contracts, the lender has
committed a tort and the analysis should focus on tort damage
methodology.
It is not uncommon for a borrower and lender to contractually alter the
duties imposed upon them as a matter of law. However, in K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co.,6° the Sixth Circuit limited the effectiveness of such
actions, allowing a borrower to recover in tort when it should have been
restricted to contract theories. There, the loan agreement allowed the lender
to refuse to advance additional funds for any reason. When the bank
subsequently refused to make a requested advance, the borrower sued. The

(where plaintiff failed to avail itself of alternative financing, although available on terms different
from those originally bargained for, no damages awarded); Allied Silk Mfgs, Inc. v. Erstein, 186
N.Y.S. 295 (1921) (where plaintiff alleged that it was compelled to discontinue its business because
of breach of the defendants' agreement to act as factors and evidence showed that other factors were
readily available and plaintiff's lack of diligence was the cause of the failure to obtain substitute
financing, only nominal damages ($.06) awarded).
56. 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981).
57. Id. at 64.
58. Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 766, 767 (1979); 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference
§ 1 (1969).
60. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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bank was ultimately held liable for $7.5 million. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, holding that although the contract did not require it, the lender had
a legal duty either to advance the funds on demand or to give notice of its
intention not to make any more advances.6 ' Not all contractual
modifications of duties implied-in-law, therefore, will be successful. The
K.M.C. court justified its result by claiming the ability to modify such
duties is limited by a standard of good-faith.6 2
What is more interesting about the K.M. C. decision, however, was the
court's willingness to uphold a $7.5 million verdict that appears
unsubstantiated by the evidence. As the court itself recognized, "the
company was heavily leveraged, its heavy losses from 1981 had eroded
stockholder equity, and it had a substantial amount of uncollectible
receivables in excess of its bad debt reserve. ' '63 Thus, even if the lender
had advanced the requested $800,000, the company may well have failed
anyway.
Even if the company would not have failed, how did the jury arrive at
the figure of $7.5 million?
The jury reached this conclusion based on testimony by two of
plaintiff's experts, who testified that the value of K.M.C. to potential
acquirors was reduced by $10 million or more by Irving's refusal to
advance the $800,000 on March 1. This testimony is inherently
incredible. Why should the value of K.M.C. fall by more than $10
million because of the lack of availability of funds for three days?
During this three day period, K.M.C. had $800,000 less money but it
also owed $800,000 less.6
In other words, if the business were worth X to potential acquirers before
the lender wrongfully withheld the additional funds, it is unlikely that the
business was worth X minus $7.5 million just three days later as a result of
the failure to loan an additional $800,000.
Damages in K.M.C. should have been based upon the expectations of
the parties at the time they entered the contract. That is, K.M.C. was
entitled to obtain the difference between the interest rate it would have paid
Irving and the "cover" interest rate it would have had to obtain when Irving
breached. If consequential damages - such as a decrease in the firm's
value - occurred (as K.M.C. alleged), then they would also be recoverable
if reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made. The court did
not purport to apply a contract methodology of damages, however, but

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 759.
Id. at 761-63.
Id. at 766.
Fischel, supra note 10, at 153 (citations omitted).
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rather appeared to try to compensate K.M.C. for the actual decrease in the
value of the firm by allowing expert testimony as to the firm's value prior
to the failure to advance funds and immediately after the refusal. 65
Although this attempt to restore the status quo is akin to reliance damages,
it is more likely that the court simply treated its theory - bad faith - as a tort.
Tort damage calculations are somewhat different than contract damage
calculations.
II. Tort Theories of Damage
It has been said that when the damage analysis switches from contract
to tort theories, the purpose of a remedy is no longer to protect the
borrower's expectation, but is rather to restore the status quo. 66 Tort
theories thus approximate the goal of reliance damages discussed above.67
However, tort theories allow easier access to consequential damages than
contract theories, and thus may compensate the borrower in an amount
greater than that necessary to restore the status quo. 68 A plaintiff may
recover a more expansive range of damages in tort actions than in contract
actions, as tort damages are based upon the concept of fault.69 In some
cases, however, a plaintiff's tort damages may be limited to the amount of
recoverable contract damages.7 ° In addition, courts have historically
demanded stricter proof of contract damages, although this requirement has

65. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 766.
66. ROBERT S. THOMPSON AND JOHN A. SEBERT, REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND
RESTITUTION § 2.01 at 2-7, Note 2-4 (1983).
67. See supra notes 26-39 & accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 67-78 & accompanying text.
69. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the
Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 217-18 (1977). See also Onam Alaska v. Bell
Lavalin, Inc., 842 P.2d 148 (Alaska 1992). Although it is generally true that damage awards are
higher in tort cases than in contract cases, this is not always true. Sometimes a plaintiff will be better
off in contract. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 35-44 (1985) (comparing Chatlos Sys. v. Nat'l Cash Register, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.
1982) with Smith v. Bowles, 132 U.S. 125 (1889)).
70. Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1992).- In
Advanced Medical, the court considered the issue of what compensatory damages were recoverable
for tortious interference with contract. The court stated that absent consequential damages, the
plaintiff should recover no more on the tort theory than on a theory of breach of contract. One of
the favorite theories of lender liability is tortious interference with contract, so this holding has
important implications for lender liability cases. Note that the court was careful to qualify its holding
by saying "absent consequential damages." For examples of tortious interference cases in a lender
liability context, see State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 688-90 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976); Davis v. Lewis,
487 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1975); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 560-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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been relaxed in recent years.7 Finally, when the borrower relies upon tort
theories, it may be able to recover punitive damages which are ordinarily
not recoverable in contract actions.72
Lender liability awards based upon tort theories are often unpredictable
because, unlike contract damages, tort damages do not require the element
of foreseeability per se.73 This unpredictability leads to an increase in the
cost of borrowing money and in the consequent damage to the economy
from the reduced flow of capital.74 On the other hand, "[i]f only contract
damages are allowed then the disabling of market participants will threaten
7
economic stability. 1
Even when an action sounds in contract, it is likely that a court will
76
allow a tort damage formulation to be used in a lender liability context.
It is fundamental that a breach of contract is not a tort, however. 7 Courts
should attempt to regain the distinction between contract and tort, and to
begin to assess a contract damage methodology in cases involving breaches
of agreements to lend money. Only when the lender breaches some duty
implied-in-law that has not been modified by agreement should the court
apply a tort methodology.78
A. Causation
The most important part of tort damage methodology is causation.
Causation has been described as both the most "pervasive" concept in tort
law, and also the most "elusive. '79 The requirement that the defendant's
act actually cause the plaintiff s loss is the first rule of damage calculation

71.

Robert N. Strassfeld, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 350

(1992) (citing DAN D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 150-57 (1973); FARNSWORTH,

supra note 52, at 881-88).
72. See infra notes 135-66 and accompanying text.
73. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 133 (1988).
74. See Brad Schacht, Note, Bad Faith Lenders, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 417, 441 (1989).
75. Ann-Marie Davidow, Note, Borrowing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. to Finance Lender
Liability Claims, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1383, 1412 (1990).
76. See, e.g., Seaman's Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984); Egan
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912
(1980); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Wallis
v. Superior Ct., 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
77. WLUAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (5th ed. 1984).
78. Once again, it is important to protect parties' freedom of contract. Within certain
limitations, parties should be free to modify duties implied-in-law. Where those duties have been
modified by contract, absent extenuating circumstances a court should not allow a borrower to assert
a tort theory based upon the modified duty.
79. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985) (citing
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (M. Howe ed. 1963)); PROSSER, supra note 46,

§ 41 at 236-37, 241.
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regardless of whether the theory of liability sounds in tort or contract 80
"In other words, if the plaintiff had no loss, or if he had one, but would have
suffered the same loss even in the absence of the defendant's actionable
misconduct, he is entitled to no recovery.""1 The main difference between
causation in contract methodology and causation in tort methodology is the
concept of "proximate cause." While tort defendants may be held liable for
all injuries proximately resulting from their actions, under a contract
methodology, causation is limited to actual cause.82
The first step in determining proximate cause is the establishment of
actual cause. In other words, the defendant's conduct must have actually
contributed to the plaintiff's injury. 3 A plaintiff's injury is seldom caused
solely by a defendant's conduct, however. Rather, the injury may be the
result of several contributing factors. Thus, proximate cause requires the
court to consider any contributing factors that might "reduce or eliminate,
for reasons of policy or principle, the defendant's legal responsibility for
harm that was caused by his tortious conduct." 8'
B. Valuation
The second rule of damages is that the plaintiff must be able to prove
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.85 If we exclude
consequential damages such as lost opportunities, valuation in a lender
liability case using tort theory is simple. In a case like K.M.C., the court
would take expert testimony regarding the worth of the business before the
borrower and lender met, and would subtract from that value the worth of
the business after the lender committed the tort to determine the borrower's
loss. If the business has failed entirely, the loss is simply the value of the
business at the inception of the lending relationship.

DOBBS, supra note 71, at 148.
81. Id. at 149.
82. "In tort law's darkest corner lurks the concept of proximate cause." Kenneth Vinson,
Proximate Cause Should Be Barred From Wandering Outside Negligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 215 (1985) [hereinafter Vinson]. On the other hand, Prosser described the concept of causation
as one of the "simplest and most obvious" problems in determining tort liability. PROSSER, supra
note 79, at § 41, at 237. See also Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence, 69
IOWA L. REV. 363 (1984); David Morris Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J.
228 (1982); Daniel J. Steinbock, et al., Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 VAND. L. REV. 261
(1988).
83. Wright, supra note 79, at 1737.
84. Id. at 1744 (citing J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 171 (6th ed. 1983); Leon Green, The
CausalRelation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 543, 548, 557-59, 564 (1962); Glanville
Williams, Causationin the Law, 1961 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62, 63-65 (1961)).
85. DOBBS, supra note 71, at 148. The degree of certainty required will vary depending upon
the nature of the tort and the circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979).
80.
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When consequential damages are added, however, the concept of
valuation .becomes more difficult. This is discussed in the next section. 6
III. Damage Concepts Common To Both Contract and Tort
Several damage theories apply to lender liability cases regardless of
whether the underlying theory is contract or tort, although their application
may differ depending upon the theory. These concepts include
consequential damages, punitive damages, and the ability to recover
prejudgment interest.
A. ConsequentialDamages
One of the most promising ways for a borrower to maximize its
recovery in a lender liability suit is by alleging that it has incurred
consequential damages due to the lender's inappropriate behavior. Before
one can consider whether consequential damages may be recovered,
however, it is important to determine what they are. Loan agreements will
87
often refer to "consequential damages," but will rarely define them.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "consequential damages" as:
Such damage, loss or injury as does not flow directly and immediately
from the act of the party, but only from some of the consequences or
results of such act. Damages which arise from intervention of special
circumstances are not ordinarily predictable. Those losses or injuries
which are a result of an act but are not direct and immediate.
Consequential damages resulting from a seller's breach of contract
include any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know
and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise, and
injury to person
or property proximately resulting from any breach of
88
warranty.
The definition of consequential damages may depend in some degree upon
the underlying theory advanced. For example, consequential damages in
a tort action may be defined in terms of a "natural and ordinary result,"

86.
87.

See infra notes 87-134 and accompanying text.
Here is a typical "Waiver of Consequential Damages" clause found in loan agreements:
In no event shall Borrower or Lender be liable to each other for consequential
damages, whatever the nature of a breach by Borrower or Lender of their respective
obligations under this Agreement or any of the Loan Documents and Borrower, for itself
and Affiliated Parties, and Lender hereby waive all claims for consequential damages.
For a discussion of waivers in written loan agreements as a method of limiting liability, see infra
notes 172-217 and accompanying text.
88.

BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
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while in a contract action they may be defined in terms of "reason to
know. '89 Usually the borrower will want to argue that because of the
lender's misbehavior, the borrower has suffered a loss of the profits it
would have ultimately gained had the lender not breached its duty (either
contract or tort).
1. Lost Profits.-Ina typical lender liability case in which a borrower
has been improperly denied capital to start a business, the borrower will
argue that the lender's improper actions caused the borrower to lose the
profits the business would have made had the lender properly funded the
loan. However, as Professor Fischel points out:
Borrowers in lender liability cases typically assert that they were unable
to obtain alternative sources of credit. What has not been fully
appreciated, however, is the fundamental incompatibility between this
claim and the borrower's simultaneous demand for huge damages to
make up for lost profits. If a business is really that valuable, market
participants would be willing to invest in it - they are leaving money
on the table if they don't. Conversely, if nobody is willing to invest, a
strong presumption arises that the business was not that valuable in the
first place.'
Professor Fischel's analysis would seem to preclude the recovery of lost
profits in any lender liability case. In reference to State National Bank v.
FarahManufacturing. Co.,9' a case in which the Texas Court of Appeals
awarded a borrower its lost profits, Fischel wrote: "[t]he calculation of lost
profits by the plaintiff's expert was meaningless. Any study that tries to
forecast profitability for the period 1976-77 by analyzing the profitability
of sales from 1959-75 (even assuming this projection was done accurately)
is inherently suspect." 92 Fischel's comment is directed at the fact that the
'59-'75 period as a whole could not be representative of conditions existing
in the single year between '76 and '77.
Despite Fischel's protestations, the loss of prospective business and/or
reputation are prototypical consequential damages and are awarded in many
contract and tort cases.93 There are, however, two significant restrictions

89. See Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc. 529 P.2d 656, 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); A.T.S.
Laboratories, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft, 391 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) ("Consequential
damages, as used here, means direct damage suffered as a direct and proximate result of defendant's
breach of the duties imposed by the warranty implied."). Regardless of the definition employed, the
concept of foreseeability is a common thread.
90. Fischel, supra note 10, at 148.
91. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
92. Fischel, supra note 10, at 152.
93. Bay State Lighting Co. v. Voight Lighting Indus., Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 708,712 (D.N.J. 1984)
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on the recovery of lost profits.94 The plaintiff must initially provide the
jury with a "reasonable basis" for computing the award. 95 This is what
concerned Fischel about the Farahcase. Second, the plaintiff must show
the value of the loss to a reasonable degree of certainty.9
The concepts of reasonable calculation and certainty are very similar,
as the former is a method of arriving at the latter. Damages must not be
based upon speculation, but rather must be well grounded. 97 The certainty
with which damages must be proven will depend upon the nature of the tort
and the surrounding circumstances. 8 Certainty applies to damages issues
in two respects. First, there must be certainty with regard to causation. 9
Second, there must be certainty as to the amount of damages.'t° The
former was discussed earlier, 0 t' while the latter will be discussed in this
section. 102
It is often said that damages need not be proven to a mathematical
certainty.10 3 Rather, there must be "some competent evidence" upon
which to base an award.104
Professor James Henderson writes:
[C]ourts must try to avoid hypothetical "what would have happened if
... ?" questions in the course of resolving tort disputes. When such
hypotheticals are addressed in adjudication, attention focuses on events
that never occurred and circumstances that never existed. If liability
rules require answers to such questions, proof gives way to speculation.
Of course, to some extent these questions are unavoidable in connection
with such issues as proximate cause and damages. But the verifiability

(trade secrets case).
94. These restrictions apply only after the borrower has proven "actual cause," a prerequisite
to the recovery of any damages. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U.S. 444 (1888);
National Controls Corp. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 833 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1987); Gurney
Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1972).
95. City of Whittier v. Whittier Fuel and Marine Corp., 577 P.2d 216, 222-24 (Alaska 1978).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 352 (1979).
97. Whittier, 577 P.2d at 222.
98.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979).

99. Dowling Supply and Equip., Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 907, 909-10 (Alaska
1971).
100. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 486 at 567 (1988).
101. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
102. Sometimes this distinction is referred to as the difference between proof of the fact of loss
and proof of the amount of loss. See, e.g., Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960)
(plaintiff must establish "reasonable probability of damage" prior to establishing a "reasonable basis"
of calculating the loss).
103. See, e.g., Dowling Supply, 490 P.2d at 909.
104. Id. at 909.
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constraint requires that liability rules avoid raising such questions
whenever possible.105
Trying to determine what profits a failed business would have earned had
it not failed is an attempt by courts and juries to learn the unknowable, and
should be discouraged.' 6
The Seventh Circuit has held that the profit that would be earned on an
unfinished commercial building is too speculative to be recovered." ° In
08
Stanish v. Polish Roman Catholic Union,1
the court held that the
plaintiff could not recover the difference between the mortgage amount and
the value of the property as developed had the lender not breached the
agreement to lend. The builder in Stanish had no "track record" for the
court to consider. Furthermore, construction on the project had not even
begun. Although the court considered these factors, they are really
irrelevant to the question of whether lost profits would be recoverable.
First, Stanish cites St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturer'sLife
Insurance Co., ° which held that even where a project was substantially
completed, the potential profits depended upon "so many uncertainties that
'
they cannot form a proper element of damages in a contract action." "
Second, even though a plaintiff has experience in the type of business being
engaged in, a "new business" without a track record of profits will not
provide the court with any basis for awarding lost profits. In Drs. Sellke &
Conlon, Ltd. v. Twin Oaks Realty, Inc.,'" the Illinois Appellate Court
stated that a business must be "established" in order to recover lost
profits." 2 There, the plaintiffs were orthodontists who had arranged for
office space from the defendant and were delayed by the defendant in
moving in. They argued that they lost profits during the two months they
were unable to use the new offices, basing their calculations on the average
number of new patients acquired each month after the opening. To
overcome the difficulty of speculation, the doctors argued that they had

105. James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901,914 (1982)
(footnotes omitted); James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 308 (1990); Morris G.
Shanker, A Retreat to Progress: A Proposal to Eliminate Damage Awards for Loss of Business
Profits, 85 COM. L.J. 83, 87 (1980).

106.
107.

Shanker, supra note 105, at 87-88.
Stanish v. Polish Roman Catholic Union, 484 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1973).

108.

Id.

109.
110.
111.
112.

278 A.2d 12 (Md.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
Stanish, 484 F.2d at 726 (quoting Chase, 278 A.2d at 38).
491 N.E.2d 912 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
Id.at 917.
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always been successful in acquiring new patients in the past, and they were
successful in acquiring new patients after the new offices opened.
Nevertheless, the court denied recovery, stating: "Nor is past success in
similar enterprises
sufficient, as conditions may vary with each
3
endeavor.""l
In Coastland Corp. v. Third National Mortgage Co.," 4 the Fourth
Circuit determined that a new construction project will be considered a new
business. That case involved a developer that sued its lender for breach of
an oral commitment to provide construction financing for a shopping
center. The court held that although the developer had been successful with
other projects, this particular project was a new business. The court cited
a line of cases that it deemed the "new business line of cases" which held
that potential profits could not be recovered for a breach of contract when
a new business is contemplated since it could not
be rendered reasonably
5
"
profits.
any
been
have
would
there
that
certain
While Coastland called an unfinished construction project a new
business, there are no specific guidelines for courts to apply in determining
whether a business is "new." In Atomic Fuel ExtractionCorp. v. Estate of
Slick," 6 a Texas appeals court stated that to avoid the consequences of
being considered a "new business," the plaintiff would have to prove that
it was an "established business":
An established business should be one that is in actual operation long
enough to give it permanency and recognition. It should be one that has
earned a profit which can reasonably be ascertained and approximated
.... Proof of an operation of a business at a loss fails to meet the test." 7
Later, in McBrayer v. Teckla, Inc.," 8 the Fifth Circuit held that even
where a business had been in operation for six months at the time the
contract to finance was breached, the business was still "unestablished"
such that future profits were too speculative to support an award. The
precedential significance of that case is dubious, however, since the
borrower had been operating at a loss during those six months and was
attempting to sell a new and innovative product.

113. Id. (citing Favar v. Riverview Park, 144 I11.App. 86, 91 (1908)).
114. Coastland Corp. v. Third Nat'l Mtg. Co., 611 F.2d 969, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 977. The court cited the following cases: Kay Advertising Co. v. Olde London
Transp. Co., 217 S.E.2d 876, 878 (Va. 1975); Mullen v. Brantley, 195 S.E.2d 696, 699-700 (Va.
1973); Pennsylvania State Shopping Plazas, Inc. v. Olive, 120 S.E.2d 372, 377 (Va. 1961); Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Hamilton & Dotson, 178 S.E. 777, 780 (Va. 1935).
116. 386 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
117. Id. at 189 (citations omitted).
118. 496 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974).

LENDER LIABILITY CASES

The "new business rule" is not without its critics." 9 While Virginia
has explicitly adopted the rule and allows no recovery of lost profits for a
new business, 120 many courts have simply paid lip-service to the rule
while creating numerous exceptions.' 2 1 Others simply decline to follow
the rule. 122 There are thus two methods of determining whether lost
profits are recoverable. "The first approach views the age of the business
as one evidentiary factor in determining whether the plaintiff has proven
damages with the requisite certainty. The second approach holds that lost
profits of a new business are never recoverable because they are inherently
speculative."' 123 Even courts applying the first approach, however,
recognize that proof of lost profits of a new business must satisfy a high
standard of proof.1"4
119. For a good discussion of the "new business rule," see 25 C.J.S. Damages §§ 18-31 (1966
& Supp. 1993); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages, §§ 624-47, 887 (1988 & Supp. 1993), Annotation,
Recovery of Anticipated Lost Profits of New Business: Post-1965 Cases, 55 A.L.R.4th 507 (1987);
Bernadette J. Bollas, Note, The New Business Rule and the Denial of Lost Profits,48 OHIO ST. L.J.
855 (1987); Regina M. Shields, Note, CommercialLaw: ConsequentialDamagesand Loss of Profits
of a New Business, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 182, 201 (1980) (discussing Alliance Tractor &
Implement Co. v. Lukens Tool & Die Co., 281 N.W.2d 778 (Neb. 1979), which upheld an award for
future profits of a new business).
120. Kay Advertising v. Olde London Transp. Co., 217 S.E.2d 876 (Va. 1975); Note, Lost Profits
For UnestablishedBusiness: Should Virginia Retain the New Business Rule?, 67 VA. L. REV. 431
(1981). Other states have not adopted the rule per se, but have traditionally not allowed recovery of
lost profits for new businesses. See, e.g., Paul O'Leary Lumber Corp. v. Mill Equip., Inc., 448 F.2d
536 (5th Cir. 1971); Taylor v. Shoemaker, 38 So.2d 895 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 38 So.2d 900
(Ala. 1949); Re v. Gannett Co., 480 A.2d 662 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984), affd, 496 A.2d 553 (Del.
1985) (en banc); Anderson v. Abernathy, 339 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1960); Burge Ice Machine Co. v.
Strother, 273 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn. 1954); Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 386 S.W.2d
180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Sam & Mary Housing Corp. v. Jo/Sal Market Corp., 468 N.Y.S.2d 294
(1983). modified on other grounds, 474 N.Y.S.2d 786, aff'd on mem. below, 440 N.Y.S.2d 185.
121. See, e.g., Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Bus. Sys., Inc., 344 S.E.2d 82 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
122. See Jeffry R. Gilbert, Note, A New or Untried Business May Recover Lost Future Profits
as Damagesfor Breach of Contract to Lend Money, ProvidedSuch Profits Can Be Establishedwith
Reasonable Certainty - Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 569 (1984-85). See also
Systems Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Vickers v. Wichita State
University, 518 P.2d 512 (Kan. 1974); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc. 242 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1976); El
Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 261 N.W.2d 358 (Neb. 1978); Merion Spring Co. v.
Muelles Hnos. Garcia Torres, S.A., 462 A.2d 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
123. Note, Lost Profits For UnestablishedBusiness: Should Virginia Retain the New Business
Rule?, 67 VA. L. REV. 431 (1981) (concluding that it should). Examples of cases following the first
approach are Colorado Coal Furnace Distrib., Inc. v. Prill
Mfg. Co., 605 F.2d 499 (10th Cir. 1979);
Handi Caddy, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 557 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1977); Lee v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir 1977); S.Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyer Bros. Parking-W.
Corp., 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); John D. Copanos & Sons v. McDade Rigging & Steel
Erection Co., 403 A.2d 402 (Md. Ct. App. 1979); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372 (Mich.
1976); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 261 N.W.2d 358 (Neb. 1978). Cf., Gold Rush
Investments, Inc. v. G.E. Johnson Constr. Co., 807 P.2d 1169 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
124. See, e.g., Handi Caddy, Inc. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 557 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1977);
Engle v. Oroville, 47 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
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Another interesting issue in considering recoverability of lost profits
is whether the requisite degree of certainty depends upon whether the cause
of action sounds in contract or tort. There is authority for the proposition
that the recovery of lost profits is easier in tort and is not subject to the
foreseeability limitations of contract cases.1 25 Indeed, all of the cases
discussed earlier involved tort actions. "When cases involving breach of
contract are compared to tort cases, it appears that less concern is shown in
the latter toward the certainty of the evidence supporting damages."' 26
It is instructive to consider the case of Lincoln NationalLife Insurance
Co. v. NCR Corp.,lz where the traditional litigation roles were reversed.
The plaintiff was a bank which claimed that the borrower simply refused to
take the money it was entitled to under their loan agreement, cauging the
bank to lose profits. The court found that money is fungible, and that the
lender was unable to prove that it "lost" profits by not loaning a certain
amount of its available cash to the borrower. In other words, it is possible
that the money that would have been lent to the borrower was actually lent
or invested in other projects. Thus, the bank was unable to demonstrate that
it had in fact lost any profits.
The Lincoln case is very similar to the analysis Professor Fischel has
applied to borrowers. The borrower in almost any lender liability case is in
the same position as the lender in the Lincoln case. Either the borrower can
borrow from someone else and simply recover the difference between the
interest rates, or the borrower was not likely to make any profits anyway.
2. Good Will & Reputation.-In addition to the monetary profitability
of a business, it is generally considered that the good will and reputation of
a firm have value. Borrowers will want to recover from their lenders the
value of lost or damaged good will and reputation. The problems facing
courts presented with such a request are: (1) how to determine whether
good will or reputation existed, (2) whether it was damaged or destroyed,
(3) if so, whether such damage or destruction was caused by the lender's
misbehavior, and (4) if so, what the value of that good will or reputation
was and is.
The last issue - valuation - is the most difficult. Courts agree that
loss of -reputation or good will is legally compensable. "Although
intangible (and not easy to prove), good will is nonetheless real."' 28
125.
actions
126.
(1955).
127.
128.

Sellar v. Clelland, 2 Colo. 532, 551 (1875) ("The recovery of consequential damages in
for tort is not subject to the same limitations that are applied to actions of contracts.").
Note, Damages: Limitations on Recovery of Lost Profits in Indiana, 31 IND. L.J. 136, 141
603 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aftid, 772 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1985).
Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Valuation is a problem, and courts have characteristically dealt with it
simply by reducing the standard to make it easier to establish. The Tenth
Circuit, for example, has said "[t]he amount cannot and hence need not be
proven with absolute precision.' ' 2 9 The New Jersey District Court found
an award for loss of reputation "unproblematic" in Bay State Lighting v.
Voight Lighting Industries."3 In many cases, recovery for loss of good
will or reputation will be allowed so long as the injury is foreseeable.'
Generally, the loss of good will will be recoverable according to the
same standards governing recovery of lost profits.'32 However, there are
courts that have held that although lost profits may be foreseeable and
capable of being proven to a reasonable degree of certainty, lost good will
is unforeseeable and too speculative to support an award.133 Presumably,
a borrower would still be able to recover for lost good will in these
jurisdictions, but would be forced to prove both the fact and value of the
loss to a greater extent than is required for lost profits. At least one
jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, has taken a step further and placed an outright
ban on the recovery of lost good will. t34
B. Punitive Damages
Punitive (or exemplary) damages are generally not available to a
borrower on a contract theory. 135 Some states have codified this

129. liaat 987, n.2 (citing Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975));
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); H
& H Prod. Inc. v. Hughes, 498 P.2d 965 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972)).
130. Bay State Lighting v. Voight Lighting Indus., 224 U.S.P.Q. 708, 712 (D.N.J. 1984).
131. Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 471 A.2d 735, 740 and n.9 (Md. Ct. App. 1984)
(recovery for damage to reputation a consequential damage as a result of tortious interference with
contractual relations) (citing Tose v. First Penn. Bank, N.A., 648 F.2d 879, 898 (3d Cir.)), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-94 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972)); Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 873,
881 (1968).
132. R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1975); Hydraform Prods. Corp.
v. American Steel, 498 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 261 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970).
133. See, e.g., National Controls Corp. v. National Semiconductor Corp., 833 F.2d 491 (3d Cir.
1987); Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons, 536 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1976); Neville Chem. Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Record Club of
Am., Inc. v. United Artists Records, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Harry Rubin & Sons,
Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 153 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1959).
134. AM/PM Franchise Assoc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 542 A.2d 90 (Pa. Super. 1988); Harry
Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Co., 153 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1959).
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981); 5 ARTHUR L.CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1077, at 438 (1964); KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 4.3 - .3(A) (Cum.
Supp. 1986); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in
the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2033 (1986); 25 C.J.S. Damages, § 120 at
1126 (1966). See also Splitt v. Deltona Corp., 662 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1981); Cochran v. Hall, 8
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principle, preventing awards of punitive damages in cases "arising out of
contract."'' 36 Other states have allowed punitive damages in contract
damages are
cases if the breach is sufficiently outrageous. 37 Punitive
31
tort.
in
based
actions
in
however,
definitely recoverable,
Punitive damages "are assessed for the avowed purpose of visiting a
punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of any loss or
detriment of the plaintiff."'' 39 They are therefore awarded apart from
compensatory or special damages and are intended to deter "particularly
aggravated misconduct" by the defendant."4 Often a plaintiff who has
the choice of suing on either a tort theory or a contract theory will choose
the tort in order to obtain punitive damages141
Some recent decisions have begun to expand the plaintiff's ability to
42
recover punitive damages in an action primarily based upon contract.
Over the last 15 years, courts have permitted the recovery of punitive43
damages in cases involving breach of contract accompanied by fraud,
breach of contract accompanied by independently tortious conduct,'"
breach of a fiduciary duty, 45 and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 46 Any of these exceptions to the general rule

F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1925); Phillips Mach. Co. v. Le Blonde, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Okla. 1980);
Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297 (Minn.
1980).
136. See, e.g., CAL. C.. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & 1993 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1405
(1989 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STATS. § 42.010 (1987 & 1991 Rev.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32 (1987 & 1992 Supp.).
137. Four states have adopted this position: Florida, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Bruce
Cameron Bennett, Comment, Punitive Damages in California Under the Malice Standard: Defining
Conscious Disregard, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1065, 1077 n.84 (1984). See also REDDEN, supra note 135
§ 2.6 at 42, JOHN C. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 1.42 at 92 (3rd ed.
1983); David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in PrivateConsumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 314
(1969).
138. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 77, at 275-76 (1935); WILLIAM PROSSER
AND WILLIAM KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984).
139. MCCORMICK, supra note 136, § 77 at 275.
140. DOBBS, supra note 71, § 3.9 at 204.
141. John, supra note 135, at 2034 n.9. It is also true, however, that under certain circumstances
the injured party may be better off seeking contractual remedies. ld. at n. 15 (citing LAYCOCK, supra
note 69, at 35-44).
142. See Randy L. Sassaman, Note, PunitiveDamages in ContractActions - Are the Exceptions
Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86, 93-96 (1980).
143. Powers v. Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720, 727-28 (N.D. 1981); Peterson v. Culver Educ.
Found., 402 N.E.2d 448, 453-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
144. Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (1977); Brink's Inc. v. City of
New York, 717 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1983).
145. Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1984); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d
36, 39-41 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Capital Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan.
1984); Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 352 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
146. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984).
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might be applied in a lender liability case. The most often seen example,
however, has been the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
A lender may act in a manner perfectly acceptable under the terms of
the agreement, and yet still be found liable for breaching the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 47 Consequently, the lender may
be subject to punitive damages. The cases which best exemplify the
application of this theory are Alaska Statebank v. Fairco,'49 Commercial
Cotton Co.0 v. United California Bank, 149 and FirstNational Bank v.
15
Twombly.
In Alaska Statebank,'5 1 the loan agreement authorized the lender to
accelerate the obligation if the borrower failed to pay any amount when due.
Additionally, the lender was authorized to take possession of the collateral
without notice to the borrower if the borrower defaulted. When the
borrower had difficulty making payments on time, the lender worked out
a plan to assist the borrower in making the payments. But, when the
borrower still could not make timely payments, the lender accelerated the
obligation and took possession of the collateral.
The borrower sued, and the Alaska Supreme Court allowed recovery
of both actual and punitive damages. 52 The fact that the lender was
authorized to take the actions it took under the contract made no difference.
The court did not even find that authorization to be unconscionable. Rather,
the court simply said that the terms were superseded by the lender's
attempts to accommodate the borrower in the past. 53 This holding is
rendered particularly egregious by the fact that there were actually two
loans involved, and the conciliations to the borrower were made on the first
loan, while the acceleration and possession of collateral were made with
regard to the second loan. Thus, the court was applying acts with regard to
one loan to override the written provisions of a second loan. As one
commentator noted, "[t]he Faircodecision illustrates a flagrant misuse of
the good faith performance obligation.""

147. See Patricia A. Milon, Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liabilityfor FinancialInstitutions?, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1197 (1987).
148. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
149. 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
150. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
151. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
152. Id. at 293.
153. It
154. Jill Pride Anderson, Note, Lender Liability For Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith
Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917, 936 (1986).
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In First National Bank v. Twombly,'" the Supreme Court of
Montana held that "[w]hen the duty to exercise good faith is imposed by
law rather than by the contract itself, ... the breach of that duty is tortious,"
and therefore supports an award of punitive damages.1 56 There, the lender
had accelerated a loan and taken an offset against the borrower's deposit
account after the borrower defaulted. The Twombly decision was based in
part on the holding of Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California
Bank,-57 where a bank was found to have negligently debited a depositor's
account for a check indorsed with unauthorized signatures. There, the court
found punitive damages justified because of the "special relationship"
between the depositor
and the bank 55 and because the bank affected the
15 9
"public welfare."'

Despite the holdings of Alaska Statebank, Twombly, and Commercial
Cotton, other courts have refused to ignore the written words of an
agreement. For example, in Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 160the
Minnesota Supreme Court refused to allow recovery of punitive damages
when a lender improperly repossessed collateral. The loan agreement in
that case authorized the repossession, and the lender, in good faith, was not
aware that the acceptance of late payments or the making of other
conciliations to the borrower would estop it from pursuing contractually
authorized remedies. Similarly, in Van Bibber v. Norris,161 the Indiana
Supreme Court found no breach of the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing as long as the security agreement authorized the conduct in issue.
Allowing punitive damages in cases based essentially on a contractual
relationship makes little sense if the parties possess equal bargaining
strength.1 62 The parties in such a relationship have the ability to set their
own standards of conduct and to provide for limitation, expansion, or
liquidation of their remedies upon the occurrence of a breach. Therefore,
there is no need to satisfy the injured party's1 63feelings and allay community
resentment by imposing punitive damages.

155.
156.
157.
158.
"special

689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
Id.at 1230.
209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1975).
For a full discussion of when a lender may be liable to its borrower as a result of their
relationship," see Kenneth M. Lodge & Thomas J. Cunningham, The Banker As Inadverrant

Fiduciary: Beware the Borrower's Special Trust & Confidence, COM. L.J. (forthcoming 1993).
159. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.

160.
161.
162.

295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980).
419 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
Note that Twombly, at least, tried to avoid characterizing the action as "contractual."

Twombly said that the duty to exercise good faith was a tort duty, not a contractual duty. First Nat'l
Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984).
163. 5 CORBIN, supra note 135, § 1077 at 438.
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Some commentators have argued that the law should require parties to
keep their promises by imposing greater liabilities upon breaching
parties. 1 These commentators believe that the notions of "laissez-faire
economics" which underlie traditional freedom of contract concepts are
outdated theories that have little utility in the modem world."6
Those commentators and courts that believe a lender should be
punished for pursuing contractually authorized courses of action through
the use of punitive damage awards do a disservice to borrowers. In the end,
lenders will refuse to accept late payments or make other conciliatory
agreements to borrowers if courts continue to apply concepts such as waiver
and estoppel to prevent their later exercise of contractual rights. Obviously,
lenders are not having difficulty finding borrowers who will agree to the
terms which allow actions such as those taken in Alaska Statebank,
Twombly, and Commercial Cotton. It makes little sense, therefore, to
punish the lender for behavior that benefits the borrower.
Additionally, the public has an interest in the financial soundness of
the nation's lenders, as evidenced by the recent Savings and Loan
crisis.' 66 Allowing courts to hold lenders liable for actions taken
consistent with their contractual agreements fails to recognize that parties
may alter their duties implied in law. The public shares just as much of an
interest in predictable functioning of lending relationships as it does in
seeing that lenders are punished for acting improperly. Borrowers
concerned about acceleration or repossession without notice should not
allow those provisions to be a part of their relationships. Borrowers may
also protect themselves with liquidated damages clauses and other
contractual protective devices. If a borrower is unable to reach agreement
with a lender on the permissible actions of the lender, the borrower may
seek financing elsewhere.

164. See GRANT GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF A CONTRACT 94-103 (1974); Thomas P. Egan, Legal
Doctrines Operating Against The Express Provisions of A Written Contract (Or When Black and
White Equal Gray). 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 261 (1993); Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's
Death of Contract?- Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-PartyInsurance
Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 330, 334 (1980).
165.

See Egan, supra note 164, at 311-12; JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL

STATE 23-26 (1967); Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the Law, 4
J. LEGAL STuD. 249, 277-84 (1975); Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and
the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1247-49, 1251-54
(1967).
166. Many experts believe that Bank failures in the 1990s will reach the same magnitude of the
Savings and Loan failures of the 1980s. ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
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C. PrejudgmentInterest
In many jurisdictions, a plaintiff will not be able to recover
prejudgment interest in the absence of such a provision in the loan
documentation or statutory authority.167 On the other hand, such interest
may be recovered
in cases based upon breach of contract if damages are
liquidated.'t 8
Courts allow the recovery of prejudgment interest when damages are
liquidated by reasoning that if the defendant knows what the damages are,
the defendant can stop the accrual of the interest by paying the claim.
When the damages are not certain, however, the lender is unable to
determine its liability prior to trial and should not be penalized for not
paying damages prior to the judgment. 69 The more appropriate view,
however, is that money has a use value and that prejudgment interest
compensates the borrower for the lender's wrongful denial of the use of the
money it had contracted to borrow. Although the lender did not technically
owe the money until the judgment was entered, the basis for the obligation
occurred much earlier than the judgment. The judgment is merely a legal
recognition of the obligation, providing the borrower with a means of
enforcing an obligation which already existed. 70 Under this view, the
interest should be recoverable whether damages are liquidated or not.
Despite the fact that prejudgment interest will be allowed when
statutorily or contractually provided for, lenders would be wise to define the
point in time at which the damages accrue. Obviously, a lender would want
this accrual to occur as late as possible. Additionally, the lender may want
to point out that allowing prejudgment interest encourages plaintiffs to
delay the progress of a lawsuit and provides disincentives for lenders to
raise meritorious defenses. These arguments have not been successful in
other cases, however. 7 '

167.

See, e.g., Monetti v. Anchor Hocking Corp., No. 87 C 9594, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5508,

*8 (N.D. Il. Mar. 20, 1992).
168. See Farwell Const. Co. v. Ticktin, 405 N.E.2d 1051 (Iii. App. Ct. 1980).
169. See Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 583 So.2d 443, 457 (La. 1991); Anthony
E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 192
(1982).
170. See State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266 (Ala. 1970); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co.,
474 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1985); Emery v. Tilo Roofing Co., 195 A. 409 (N.H. 1937); Laudenberger v.
Port Auth., 436 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1981); Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.
1985); Kent W. Seifried, Comment, Recovery of Prejudgment Interest On An Unliquidated State
Claim Arising Within the Sixth Circuit, 46 U. CNN. L. REV. 151 (1977).
171. See Trans Global Alloy, 583 So.2d at 458.
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IV. Reducing Damages Contractually
One method by which a lender can reduce potential damages in a
lender liability case is through the use of contractual clauses. The most
common of these are contractual waivers of consequential damages and
waivers of the right to a jury. In addition to these, lenders would be wise
to include clauses allowing a choice of law or forum, an anti-adhesion
clause, and a forbearance agreement.
A. Choice of Law or Choice of Forum'72
The ability to choose where one's action will be heard and what law
will be applied is significant. One can easily see how having Virginia's
hard and fast "new business rule" apply to a lender liability case would be
helpful to a lender.1 73 Choosing the applicable law and location of any
action can be extremely beneficial and should not be overlooked in drafting
loan documentation.
A lender may include a choice of forum clause in loan documentation
as long as there is no fraud on the part of the lender. 174 Such a clause
must be clear and explicit, 175 and the chosen forum must bear some
reasonable relationship to either the parties or the transaction. 76
Choice of law provisions are similar to choice of forum clauses, and
will usually be respected so long as the law chosen to apply bears some
77
reasonable relationship to either the parties or the transaction.
B. Jury Waiver

78

Conventional wisdom holds that a lender should seek to avoid
juries. 179 This "wisdom" is based on the many large awards made to
borrowers and against lenders by juries. 1"° The alternative, however, may
be no better. In Penthouse Internationalv. Dominion FederalSavings &

172.

See Appendix A for an example of a choice of law or forum clause.

173.

See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.

174.

Cf Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315 (4th

Cir. 1982).

175.

Credit Alliance Corp. v. Crook, 567 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

176.

Hall v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 411 (1984). New York allows cases involving

at least $250,000 to specify New York as the forum regardless of whether the contract bears a
reasonable relationship to the state. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1987).
177. See Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 494 (1976); Frame
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673 (1971).
178. See Appendix B for an example of a jury waiver clause.
179.
1987).

180.

Alvin B. Davis, The Case Against Juries in Lender Liability,ABA BANMINu J. 184 (October

See examples cited supra note 13.
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Loan Ass'n,'81 a $129 million lender liability award was made, not by a
jury, but by a judge. Jury waiver clauses should therefore not be considered
a panacea. Nevertheless, if a particular lender wouldfeel more comfortable
in front of a judge than a jury, there can be little harm in including a
contractual jury waiver.
There are essentially three requirements for a valid jury waiver. First,
it must be contained in a valid contract. If the contract is not valid - that
is if it was induced fraudulently or by duress - then the jury waiver clause
will not be effective. 8 2 Second, the waiver must be supported by
consideration.18 3 This consideration could take the form of a mutual
waiver by both the lender and the borrower. s4 Third, the waiver must be
clear and conspicuous. 5 To meet this requirement, lenders are advised
to place the waiver just above the signature lines. 6 No matter how clear
the waiver is, if it is buried in fine print, it will be unenforceable against the
borrower.' 87
In addition to these three technical requirements, a jury waiver must
be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.188 Although the three technical
requirements assist in satisfying the broader policy of ensuring knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waivers, a lender should be sure to explain the
jury waiver to the borrower and should document that explanation so that
it can prove the explanation was made. It may be helpful to have the
borrower's counsel acknowledge the waiver. 9
C. Arbitration
Some commentators have suggested that lenders may reduce their
exposure to runaway jury verdicts by including arbitration clauses in their
loan agreements.' 9 These commentators point out several advantages of

181. 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
182. See Bank of New York v. Cheng Yu Corp., 413 N.Y.S.2d 471 (2nd Dep't 1979).
183. Robert H. MacKinnon & Nathan M. Eisler, Drafting Lending Documents To Avoid Lender
Liability Claims, in LENDER LIABIITY LITIGATION, 1988, at 746 (PLI 1988).
184. Id.
185. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985).
186. See, e.g., N. Feldman & Son, Ltd. v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va.
1975).
187. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
188. MacKinnon & Eisler, supra note 183.
189. See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 139-40 (D. Me. 1976).
190. See, e.g., California Banks Using Arbitration To Cut Court Costs, Avoid Jury Verdicts,
BNA's BANKING REP., Mar. 28, 1988, at 544; California Banks Turning To Arbitration Clauses;
Huge Awards for Damages Prompt Lenders to Seek Protection from Lawsuits, AM. BANKER, Sept.
11, 1987, at 2; William W. Park, When the Borrower and the Banker Are at Odds: The Interaction
of Judge and Arbitrator in Trans-Border Finance, 65 TULANE L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1991).
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requiring arbitration. First, arbitration is generally faster than litigation."' 1
The American Arbitration Association has reported that approximately 90%
of all arbitration claims are resolved within six months to a year, with most
Second, arbitration is
taking no more than a day or two to resolve.'
cheaper than litigation. "A Presidential Commission found that arbitrations
typically require only 50% to 85% of the cost of comparable court
litigation."'193 This savings is accomplished through reduced discovery
and its attendant disputes. 94
However, one of the factors that would allow a lender to save money
by presenting a case to arbitrators provides the basis for our
recommendation that lenders not include an arbitration clause in their loan
documentation. Arbitration prevents lengthy and expensive appeals. The
decisions of arbitrators are usually reviewable only for fraud, partiality,
corruption, or gross misconduct by the arbitrator. 95 Unfortunately, it is
usually only the lender who is inclined to appeal adverse rulings.
It should be noted that arbitration is primarily designed to lift the
burdens of an overloaded docket from the courts, and that therefore, courts
are not willing to allow all arbitration matters to be placed back in their
laps.' 96 This concept was recognized by the United States Supreme Court
as early as 1854, when it held, "If the award is within the submission, and
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law
or in fact."' 97 "It is the essence of the law of arbitration that the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards is very limited .. .For practical

purposes, therefore, unless a statutory ground for vacating or modifying the
award is established, the award will be confirmed."' 98 Even when an
arbitration panel makes gross errors of judgment regarding the law or

191. Michael L. Weisman, Drafting to Avoid Lender Liability, in Documenting The Commercial
Loan: Doing it Right (1990).
192. Id
193. Id.
194. This is not always the case. For example, in a dispute between Condec Corporation and

Kaiser Aluminum, the arbitration took over eight years and involved "more than 30,000 pages of
transcripts, 5,000 exhibits, 2,500 pages of briefs, 200 hearing days, and a final opinion of more than
600 pages." Lyons, Arbitration, The Slower, More Expensive Alternative, AM. LAw., Jan. - Feb.

1985, at 107. There is obviously no way to know what the difference would have been had the
dispute been before a court, but this example should at least dispel the notion that arbitration is quick,
simple, and inexpensive in every case.
195. Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. (1985 &Supp. 1992). The Uniform Arbitration Act has
been adopted in 35 states and the District of Columbia.
196. See, e.g., Warren E.Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J., Dec. 1985,
at 3.
197.
198.

Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
GEORGE GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 65-67 (1977).
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mistakes of fact, or is flat out wrong in its application of the law, a court
will refuse to vacate the award unless the statutory basis is met.'
One
commentator stated: "Unlike judges, arbitrators are not required, strictly
speaking, to apply rules of law. Rather, arbitrators are expected to be just,
fair, and equitable, basing their decision on common sense.' '2°
Arbitration panel decisions are unlikely to be in writing, and there will
usually not be a court reporter present during the proceedings. 20 1 Thus,
there would be very little record upon which to base an appeal in any event.
Essentially, arbitration provides a way for courts to lighten their dockets
and for the parties to save a little money, but at the expense of the
opportunity to have the decision reviewed.2 2 For this reason, lenders
should be advised not to include arbitration clauses in their loan
documentation. 2 3
Some lenders may be concerned about runaway jury verdicts, and hope
that arbitrators will be less likely to make huge awards in the event liability
is established. There is no evidence, however, that arbitrators are more
conservative than juries in making their awards.2 °4 In fact, there is
evidence that judges are just as likely as juries to make large awards, a fact
which should cause some concern as to whether an arbitration panel would
be any more restrained.2 5

199. See, e.g., Raugh v. Rockford Prod. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 636 (I11.
1991).
200. Special Project Note, Lender Liability and Arbitrator: Preserving the Fabric of
Relationship, 42 VAND. L. REv. 947, 964 (1989) (citing James Acret, Arbitrate or Litigate?, 5 CAL.
LAW., June 1985, at 67; Hugh R. Jones, ArbitrationFrom the Viewpoint of the PracticingAttorney:
An Analysis of Arbitration Cases Decided By The New York State Court of Appeals From January,
1973 to September, 1985, 14 FORDHAM URD. L.J. 523, 525 (1986); S.REP. NO. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1924)) [hereinafter Special Project Note, Arbitration].
201. Steven A. Meyerowitz, The ArbitrationAlternative, 71 A.B.A.J. Feb. 1985, at 78.
202. Or, for that matter, to try their dispute fully informed.
203. Bank of America is the most noted user of arbitration clauses in commercial loan
agreements. So far that Bank has indicated that it is pleased with the results, but cautions that it has
little experience. It believes that the presence of the arbitration clause assists it in negotiation and
settlement. Special Project Note, Arbitration,supra note 200, at 976 n.196.
Others have suggested that arbitration may be used in a macro sense to prevent the "domino
effect" of large lender liability verdicts. These commentators believe that one reason juries return
such high verdicts is because earlier large verdicts are so well publicized. By resorting to arbitration,
the verdicts are kept private and, therefore, do not encourage more litigation. Special Project Note,
Arbitration, supra note 200, at 977 n.207 (citing Walsh, Common Law Claims Against Lenders, in
LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988, at 9, 12 (PLI 1988)).

204. The lack of any empirical studies comparing litigation to arbitration has been noted. See
Kritzer & Anderson, The ArbitrationAlternative: A ComparativeAnalysis of Case ProcessingTime,
Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American ArbitrationAssociation and the Courts, 8 JUsT. Sys.
J. 6, 7 (1983).
205. There is some question as to whether an arbitration panel may award punitive damages.
Traditionally, at least, that power has been held to be available only to courts. Hoellering, Remedies
in Arbitration, 20 FORUM 516, 520 (1985). The leading case upholding this proposition is Garrity
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One possible reconciliation for lenders under pressure to reduce legal
fees might be to include an arbitration clause in consumer loan
documentation, but not in commercial loan documentation. By doing so,
the lender hedges, saving some money in defending lender liability actions
by consumers, where significantly less money is likely to be at stake. In
commercial cases, where astronomical sums may be involved, the lender
will be secure in the knowledge that it will be able to obtain full discovery
and review of any adverse decisions.
D. Waiver of ConsequentialDamages"°
In some cases, the consequential damage waiver may reduce the
damages available to a borrower. Consequential damage waiver clauses
have been upheld as valid by many courts.2' They will only be operable,
however, when the plaintiff is proceeding upon a tort theory. 208 The case
of Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walters' involved a lawsuit sounding in
both contract and tort. The tort alleged was "negligent breach of contract."
In that situation, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could
not sue in tort simply to avoid the limitation of damages clause. However,
this implies that a proper suit in tort would not be impacted by a contractual
clause limiting damages. Rather, the plaintiff was prompted to file a tort
action by its intention to evade the limitation clause, even though the facts
were simply indicative of a breach of contract.
A case similar to the Orkin case is Motif ConstructionCorp.v. Buffalo
Sav. Bank.1 0 There, the plaintiff was a developer who alleged that the

v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976). Some courts, such as Shaw v. Kuhne & Ass'n, 698
P.2d 880 (N.M. 1985) and School City of East Chicago v. East Chicago Federation of Teachers, 422
N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct App. 1981) have followed the reasoning of Garrity that punitive damages are
a form of punishment, which may only be imposed by the state. Other courts have disagreed,
however. See, e.g., Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983);
Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aft'd,
776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984); Rodgers Builders, Inc.
v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr., Inc., 676
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
206. See supra note 87 for an example of a waiver of consequential damages clause.
207. See, e.g., Frey Dairy v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., Inc., 886 F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir.
1989); A.M.R. Enter., Inc. v. United Postal Say. Ass'n, 567 F.2d 1277, 1282 (5th Cir. 1978);
WXON-TV, Inc. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 F. Supp. 1261, 1264-65 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
208. See Barribeau v. Hansen Auto Sales, 384 N.W.2d 366 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) ("The court
properly allowed consequential damages. While the contract disallowed consequential damages, this
is not an action on the contract."). See also Conway Pub., Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., No. C82-1862A
(N.D. Ga. Slip Op. August 17, 1983) (contractual limitation of consequential damages does not
preclude their recovery under tort theories).
209. 466 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
210. 374 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1975).
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defendant bank agreed to grant construction loans to the developer but then
failed to lend the money when the developer began work on the project. As
a result, the plaintiff claimed a loss of profits and serious damage to its
reputation, causing it to become insolvent. The defendant conceded to the
causes of action based upon breach of contract, and the question on appeal
was whether or not the counts based upon "prima facie tort" were viable.
The New York Court of Appeals wrote: "[u]nless the contract creates a
relation out of which relation springs a duty, independent of the mere
contract obligation (here, to lend money to plaintiff on building loans)
though there may be a breach of contract, there is no tort, since there is no
duty to be violated." '' The court found the plaintiff had alleged no duty
on the part of the defendant independent of the contract relation. It further
noted that the plaintiff's affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment failed to set forth facts that would show the defendant acted
tortiously. It is unclear whether the Motif court would have allowed
consequential damages had the tort claims survived.
A bank that has a contractual waiver of consequential damages in its
lending agreements may argue that the waiver applies to all conduct arising
out of the contractual relationship. A tort, however, usually arises
independent of a contract, although it may relate to obligations growing out
of a contract.2 12 If a borrower is successful in arguing that the tortious
conduct stands apart from the contract, consequential damages will not be
barred by the waiver.
E. Anti-Adhesion Clause
The anti-adhesion clause is a device that can be used by lenders to
forestall arguments by borrowers that certain provisions in the loan
documentation are unconscionable. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract
is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so
limit the application 2of
any unconscionable term as to avoid any.
13
unconscionable result.

211. Motif, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (quoting Rich v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 395
(1882)).
212. Stella Flour & Feed Corp. v. National City Bank, 136 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1954), aft'd, 127
N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1955).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
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The mere fact that the lender in most instances will be in a superior
bargaining position to the borrower will not provide the borrower with a
basis to argue unconscionability. If the borrower can show a gross
inequality of bargaining power, however, coupled with terms unreasonably
favorable to the lender, or if the borrower can show that it had no
meaningful choice or alternative to the unfair terms, it will be able to claim
that the term (or the entire agreement) is unconscionable.
This argument might be prevented by including a clause such as the
following in the loan documentation: "This Agreement shall not be
construed to have originated with either party and the parties herein have
been fully represented by counsel in the drafting and negotiation of this
Agreement. ' 21 4 As there is no significant case law on the subject, the
legal effect of such a clause has yet to be determined.
F. Liquidated Damages
Borrowers who are starting new businesses would be wise to include
a liquidated damages clause, as this will help them avoid difficulties in
jurisdictions following the new business rule. 2 5 For example, in Guard
v. P & R Enterprises,Inc.,216 the Alaska Supreme Court noted that the
absence of such a provision harmed the plaintiffs claim. Recall also that
inclusion of a liquidated damages provision allows the plaintiff to recover
prejudgment interest.2" 7 Nevertheless, the advantages to the lender of
having a liquidated damages clause outweigh the disadvantages. Although
in some situations a lender may reduce its potential liability by not having
a liquidated damages clause, as when the jurisdiction applies the new
business rule and thus denies the borrower a recovery without such a clause,
in far more cases, the uncertainty that goes along with the absence of a
liquidated clause is not worth the risk. It is far better for the lender to know
where it stands should difficulties develop. Therefore, lenders should
specify in their loan documentation what damages will be recoverable by
the borrower in the event the lender breaches.
G. ForbearanceAgreement
A forbearance agreement is a workout device employed by lenders to
maintain the lending relationship after a borrower begins to show signs of
weakening, while strengthening the lender's own position. The forbearance
agreement gives the troubled borrower additional time to get itself together

214.
215.
216.
217.

Weisman, supra note 191, at 441.
See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new business rule.
631 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1981).
Farwell Const. Co. v. Ticktin, 405 N.E.2d 1051 (111.App. Ct. 1980).
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or seek alternative financing. The borrower, in turn, admits that it is in
default, that the cure period has expired, and that the specific dollar amount
is due and owing. In addition, the lender may be able to get the borrower
to confirm the validity of all security interests, to agree that the borrower
has no defenses to the lender's exercise of its remedies with regard to those
interests, and to waive any defenses, counterclaims, setoff, or other claim
the borrower (or guarantor) may hold.
A forbearance agreement is an excellent method for a lender to
strengthen itself against a lender liability suit should one be suspected. In
addition, the forbearance agreement allows the lender to maintain a lending
relationship with a borrower who has a genuine possibility of rehabilitation.
H. Advance Notice of Termination
A lender should always give its borrower the opportunity to seek
alternative financing before terminating a line of credit. This was the
mistake of Irving Trust in the K.M.C. case. Failure to give advance notice
of termination will enhance the likelihood of a finding of bad faith by a
court. Lenders are therefore strongly urged to provide defaulted borrowers
with written advance notice of termination.
V. Borrower Liability: Turning The Tables
Lenders are not the only parties potentially guilty of wrongdoing in a
lending relationship, although they seem to be the only party ever to be
punished. 18 Borrowers are often guilty of some misconduct in a lending
relationship. 219 Where a borrower has behaved inappropriately, the lender
should have either an independent cause of action or a defense to the
borrower's lender liability action.2
In 1991, a jury awarded NCNB Texas National Bank $735,000 in
damages from its borrower, 5-M Commercial Services Co. 22 1 In that
case, the lender sued the borrower, alleging that the borrower either

218. See James R. Butler, Is Lender Liability Now Absolute Liability?, 15 W. ST. U. L. REv. 595,
605 (1988).
219. Perhaps the greatest example of borrower misconduct occurs in consumer mortgages. A
recent study indicated that as many as 11.3% of all mortgage applications include "material
misrepresentations" by an individual borrower, mortgage broker, appraiser, or others. Kenneth R.
Harney, Lenders Are Out To Get Those Who Lie On Mortgage Applications, STAR TRIB., June 20,
1992, at 3R; Kenneth R. Harney, Mortgage Lenders Disturbed by Increased Borrower Fraud,
ATLANTA CONST., June 21, 1992, at Sec. H, p. 16.
220. Remember that often the best defense is a good offense.
221. Paula-Moore, NCNB's Legal Victory Could Turn Legal Tides Against Borrowers, SAN
ANTONIO BUS. J., July 19, 1991, at 2.
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intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented its solvency in applying for
a $150,000 loan.222 The borrower returned fire, accusing the bank of
breaching an oral agreement and of using the bank's large size to take
advantage of a small business. 223 Despite the borrower's lamentations,
the jury sided with NCNB.
Some attorneys speculate that the NCNB verdict signals a trend toward
borrower, rather than lender, liability. In light of the savings and loan
debacle and the impending bank crisis, jurors have become aware that
banks do not print money, that there is only a finite supply of it, and that
large recoveries by borrowers ultimately come from the pockets of ordinary
people. Thus, when a borrower acts improperly, jurors are willing to
compensate the lender for its losses.
Not all borrower liability actions will be successful, however. For
example, in 1991 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
Chrysler Capital Realty, a lender, could not recover a loss incurred as a
result of fraud in the inducement.2 24 The lender had extended a $12
million loan to a limited partnership so that the partnership could purchase
a building. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the building. When the
borrower defaulted, the lender bid for the building at its auction in the
amount owed on the loan. The lender then sued the borrower for $5.3
million, alleging that the property was only worth $7.4 million at the time
of the sale. The lawsuit alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of contract, and other tort claims.
The Second Circuit, relying on Whitestone Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Allstate Insurance Co. 225 upheld the district court's dismissal of the
lender's complaint on the basis that the lender received full satisfaction of
the debt by acquiring the property through foreclosure.22 6 The court
rejected the lender's arguments that borrowers should not be shielded from
liability for their fraudulent conduct. The court replied that the policy of
finality in foreclosure sales outweighs concerns of fraudulent actions by
borrowers.
Regardless of whether there has been a shift from lender liability to
borrower liability, all agree that the boom of lender liability cases in the 80s

222. The bank alleged that the borrower submitted financial statements listing assets it did not
own, failed to list debts, and inflated the value of company equipment.
223. The borrower also alleged the bank comitted usury by loaning money to an individual
guarantor and then requiring the money to be paid back by the corporation. The judge dismissed this
claim.
224. Chrysler Capital Realty, Inc. v. Grella, No. 90-7549 (2d Cir. Aug. 19, 1991).
225. 270 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1971).
226. See also Sumitomo Bank v. Taurus Developers, Inc., 229 Cal Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that a lender making a full amount bid was prevented from suing for deficiency).
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has not carried over into the 90s.2" This may be the result of lower loan
volume, or of greater consideration for the interests of lenders by courts and
juries. Most likely, it is some combination of the two.
In addition, many states have begun to enact legislation intended to
shield lenders from spurious claims by borrowers of oral promises and
modifications to loan agreements. These "credit agreement statutes" require
all modifications to loan agreements to be in writing.2 It is too early to
tell what impact this legislation will have on the lending industry, but it is
expected to be beneficial to lenders.
VI. Conclusion
The lesson to be learned from cases such as K.M.C. and Alaska
Statebank is that lenders should be hesitant to extend favors to borrowers.
A lender wishing to maintain a good relationship with a borrower should
negotiate a forbearance agreement that clearly states the lender's retention
of its contractual rights. Before foreclosing or taking other action, lenders
must give borrowers a reasonable period of notice. No verbal assurances
should be given that run counter to the terms of the written agreement. 229
Lenders defending against lender liability lawsuits should consider
carefully the theories being relied upon by the borrower. As often as

227. See Moore, supra note 221, at 2.
228. See ALA. CODE § 8-9-2(7) (Supp. 1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(13) (Supp. 1993);
ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(9) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-101(d)-(e) (Michie Supp.
1993); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124 (Supp. 1993);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-550(a)(6) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 2714(b)
(Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7) (Michie
Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1(8) (Supp. 1993); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 7101-03
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-2-1.5 (Bums 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17
(West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-117 to -119 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.010(9)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:1121-23 (West Supp. 1993); MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-317 (1991); MINN. STAT. § 513.33 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
432.045 (Vernon Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1,112 to -1,115 (Supp. 1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.220(4)-(5) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-6-5 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-5 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-0604(4)-(5) (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 140 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.580(1)(h) (Butterworth Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-8-2-(4) (1993); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-2-101(b) (Supp. 1993); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (West Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(6) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2.9 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.110 to .140 (West Supp. 1993). See also Rural American Bank v.
Herickhoff, No. CX-90-2341, 1992 Minn. LEXIS 154 (Minn. June 5, 1992); Drewes v. First Nat'l
Bank, 461 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability:
The Trend Toward Written Credit Agreement Statutes, 76 MiNN. L. REV. 295 (1991); Stephen A.
Kouri and LeAnna L. Karnopp, An Act in Relation to Credit Agreements: A Statutory Defense to
Lender Liability, ILLINOIS BAR JOURNAL 348 (July 1990).
229. Special Project Note, Written Agreements in the Lender-Borrower Context: The Illusion of
Certainty, 42 VAND. L. REV. 917, 935 (1989).
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possible, a lender will want to characterize a borrower's claims as
contractual in nature and emphasize the expectations of the parties at the
outset of the lending relationship. A lender should also consistently
challenge the foreseeability of the borrower's alleged damages.
Where cases are based on theories essentially contractual in nature, the
courts should consider the fact that the parties may modify some duties
implied by law. While it is true that the duty to act in good faith cannot be
modified per se, a lender and borrower may agree that the lender may take
certain actions that might be considered in bad faith absent their agreement.
Nevertheless, despite written agreements, a lender should attempt to give
the borrower advance notice of termination whenever possible. The failure
to do so may result in a finding of bad faith and higher damages based on
a tort theory.
Finally, lenders who are sued by their borrowers would be wise to
scrutinize the borrower's actions carefully. Where appropriate, a
counterclaim can be very effective. Hopefully, with the public becoming
more aware of the long-term effects of outrageous lender liability verdicts
based upon emotion rather than logic, these excessive and unjustified
awards will be reduced.
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APPENDIX A
Here is an example of a typical choice of law or forum clause that will
allow the lender to control where a borrower must sue the lender:
Borrower hereby consents to the jurisdiction of any state or federal court
located within Cook County, Illinois, and waives any objection it may
have based on improper venue orforum non conveniens to the conduct
of any proceeding instituted hereunder and consents to the granting of
such legal or equitable relief as is deemed appropriate by the court.

LENDER LIABILITY CASES

APPENDIX B
Here is an example of a typical jury waiver clause lenders can include
in their documentation if they wish to avoid having a jury hear a lawsuit
brought by a borrower:
Each party to this Agreement hereby expressly waives any right to trial
by jury of any claim, demand, action or cause of action (1) arising under
this Agreement or any other instrument, document or agreement
executed or delivered in connection herewith, or (2) in any way
connected with or related or incidental to the dealings of the parties
hereto or any of them with respect to this Agreement or any other
instrument, document or agreement executed or delivered in connection
herewith, or the transactions related hereto or thereto, in each case
whether now existing or hereafter arising and whether sounding in
contract or tort or otherwise; and each party hereby agrees and consents
that any such claim, demand, action, or cause of action shall be decided
by court trial without a jury, and that any party to this agreement may
file an original counterpart or a copy of this section with any court as
written evidence of the consent of the parties hereto to the waiver of
their right to trial by jury.

